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matrix-org
Olm
Commits
930c4677
Commit
930c4677
authored
Nov 08, 2019
by
Richard van der Hoff
Browse files
Update signing.md to use operatorname
parent
04690658
Changes
1
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docs/signing.md
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930c4677
...
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
...
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
where:
where:
```
math
```
math
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
S =
\operatorname{
ECDH
}
\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{
ECDH
}
\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,E_E\right)
\operatorname{
ECDH
}
\left(E_A,E_E\right)
```
```
Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
...
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
...
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:
deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:
```
math
```
math
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
S =
\operatorname{
ECDH
}
\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{
ECDH
}
\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,E_B\right)
\operatorname{
ECDH
}
\left(E_A,E_B\right)
```
```
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $
`E_A`
$ and
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $
`E_A`
$ and
...
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
...
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
If $
`E_B`
$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
If $
`E_B`
$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
because the ability to calculate $
`ECDH\left(I_A,
\,
E_B\right)`
$ requires
because the ability to calculate $
`
\operatorname{
ECDH
}
\left(I_A,E_B\right)`
$ requires
knowledge of the private parts of either $
`I_A`
$ (proving Alice's
knowledge of the private parts of either $
`I_A`
$ (proving Alice's
involvement) or $
`E_B`
$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
involvement) or $
`E_B`
$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that
*both*
Alice and Bob
signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that
*both*
Alice and Bob
...
...
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