Commit 930c4677 by Richard van der Hoff

### Update signing.md to use operatorname

parent 04690658
 ... @@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $S$, ... @@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $S$, where: where: math math S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\; S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\; ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; ECDH\left(E_A,E_E\right) \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_E\right)   Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of ... @@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in ... @@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows: deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows: math math S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\; S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\; ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; ECDH\left(E_A,E_B\right) \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right)   If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $E_A$ and If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $E_A$ and ... @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger. ... @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger. If $E_B$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary If $E_B$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation, show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation, because the ability to calculate $ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)$ requires because the ability to calculate $\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)$ requires knowledge of the private parts of either $I_A$ (proving Alice's knowledge of the private parts of either $I_A$ (proving Alice's involvement) or $E_B$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the involvement) or $E_B$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob ... ...
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