Commit 930c4677 authored by Richard van der Hoff's avatar Richard van der Hoff
Browse files

Update to use operatorname

parent 04690658
......@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
......@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and
......@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
because the ability to calculate $`ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)`$ requires
because the ability to calculate $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)`$ requires
knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's
involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob
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