Update signing.md to use operatorname (930c4677) · Commits · matrix-org / Olm

docs/signing.md

+7 −7

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
		where:

		```math
		S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
		ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
		ECDH\left(E_A,E_E\right)
		S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
		\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
		\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_E\right)
		```

		Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
		@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
		deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:

		```math
		S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
		ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
		ECDH\left(E_A,E_B\right)
		S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
		\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
		\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right)
		```

		If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and
		@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
		If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
		transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
		show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
		because the ability to calculate $`ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)`$ requires
		because the ability to calculate $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)`$ requires
		knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's
		involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
		signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that both Alice and Bob